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Abstract
We reanalyzed data from Scherer and Wallbott’s (Scherer, 1997a, 1997b; Scherer &
Wallbott, 1994; Wallbott & Scherer, 1995) International Study of Emotion Antecedents
and Reactions to examine how phenomenological reports of emotional experience,
expression, and physiological sensations were related to each other within cultures, and to
determine if these relationships were moderated by cultural differences, which were
operationally defined using Hofstede’s typology. Multilevel Random Coefficient
Modeling analyses produced several findings of note. First, the vast majority of the
variance in ratings was within countries (i.e., at the individual level); a much smaller
proportion of the total variance was between-countries. Second, there were negative
relationships between country-level means and Long vs. Short Term Orientation for
numerous measures. Greater long term orientation was associated with lowered emotional
expressivity and less physiological sensations. Third, at the individual (within-culture)
level, across the seven emotions, there were consistent and reliable positive relationships
between verbal and nonverbal expression and between verbal and nonverbal expression
and physiological reactions, indicating coherence among the emotion response systems.
And fourth, such relationships among the phenomenological variables were not moderated
by cultural differences, as measured by the Hofstede dimensions.
Evidence for Universality in Phenomenological Emotion Response System Coherence
Research on the phenomenological aspects of emotion has made important
contributions to our understanding of emotions. Previous studies have demonstrated that
several emotions can be differentiated according to their appraisal dimensions (Frijda et
al., 1989; Scherer, 1997a, 1997b); expressive behavior and physiological sensations
(Scherer & Wallbott, 1994); action readiness (Frijda et al., 1989), action tendencies,
goals, and actions (Roseman et al., 1994); and subjective experience (Roseman et al.,
1994; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994). Collectively, they demonstrate that phenomenological
experience can differentiate among discrete emotion states.
One important corollary to the idea that emotions are organized as discrete,
qualitatively different states is the notion that the various components of emotion –
appraisals, subjective experience, physiological responses, expressive behaviors, and
action tendencies – are related to each other in a systematic fashion. In the literature, one
way to characterize this notion has been the term emotion response system coherence.
Such coherence, which would be evidenced by covariation among the components, is
important to an understanding of emotions, and especially discrete emotions. Coherent
responses prepare the organism to respond efficiently to the environment, enhance the
reliability of emotion signals, and provide rapid coordination of social actions between
individuals, such as between parents and children, romantic partners, or bosses and
subordinates.
Previous studies have provided evidence for such coherence. The strongest
evidence comes from several sources: studies reporting positive relationships between
emotional experience and facial expressions of basic emotions when emotions were
actually elicited (Ekman et al., 1990; Ekman et al., 1980; Ekman et al., 1988; Gosselin et
al., 1995; Matsumoto & Kupperbusch, 2001; Mauss et al., 2005; Rosenberg & Ekman,
1994; Ruch, 1993, 1995); studies of smiles and laughter and the experience of joy
(Duchenne smiles), embarrassment (gaze aversion and control attempts), and amusement
(Frank et al., 1993; Hess et al., 1995; Keltner, 1995; Keltner & Bonanno, 1997; McGhee,
1977; Ruch, 1995; Smith, 1995); studies on the “facial feedback hypothesis,” which
suggests that facial expressions augment subjective emotional experience (Hess et al.,
1992; Laird, 1974; Matsumoto, 1987; McIntosh, 1996; Soussignan, 2002; Winton, 1986);
and studies reporting positive relationships between ratings of perceived expression
intensity and inferences about subjective experiences across cultures (Matsumoto et al.,
1999). The research is not unequivocal, however; some studies have not found
relationships between experience and expression, or only weak relationships (Fernandez-
Dols & Ruiz-Belda, 1995; Fernandez-Dols & Ruiz-Belda, 1997; Kraut & Johnson, 1979;
Ruiz-Belda et al., 2003; Schneider & Josephs, 1991; Schneider & Unzner, 1992;
Soussignan & Schaal, 1996).
Studies examining the relationship between experience and physiological
reactions are less consistent. Early studies found relatively weak relationships (Mandler
et al., 1961; Weinstein et al., 1968), but more recent studies have found somewhat
stronger relationships (Hubert & de Jong-Meyer, 1990). Ekman, Levenson, and Friesen
(1983) demonstrated that facial expressions are linked with unique signatures in the
autonomic nervous system. Similar links exist between expression and central nervous
system activity (Ekman & Davidson, 1993; Ekman et al., 1990). Nevertheless,  these
relationships tend to be only low to moderate in size (Brown & Schwartz, 1980; Lang et
al., 1993). Recently, Mauss et al. (2005) tested the coherence between experience,
expression, and physiology by measuring them in second-by-second precision as
participants watched amusing and sad films. They reported strong, within-person
correlations between experience and expression (absolute value of the significant rs = .22
- .51) and expression and physiology (absolute value of significant rs = .19 - .52).
All of the studies cited in the previous two paragraphs examined emotions
actually elicited in laboratory-controlled settings. Studies examining coherence among
phenomenological aspects of emotion responding, however, are very rare. To our
knowledge, only one report to date has examined such coherence. Frijda et al. (1989)
conducted two studies in which they asked Dutch students to recall an instance where
they experienced each of eight emotions. They rated each on multiple dimensions of
appraisals and action readiness items. Regression analyses indicated that the appraisal
ratings accounted for, on average, 19% and 24% of the action tendencies’ variance in
both studies, respectively.
Thus, while there is a small but growing literature on coherence examining
emotions in the laboratory, there is a dearth of evidence examining the coherence among
phenomenological aspects of emotional responding.
The Importance of Testing Emotion Response System Coherence across Cultures
Testing coherence among phenomenological aspects of emotional responding
across cultures is important for several reasons. First, as mentioned above, the only study
to date to examine such coherence is Frijda et al.’s (1989), and there only two aspects of
emotion – appraisals and action readiness tendencies – were examined. If system
coherence exists, it should exist across a broader range of emotional responses. We test
that notion below using verbal utterances, nonverbal behaviors, two aspects of emotional
experience, and three types of physiological sensations.
Second, there is a large literature (Averill et al., 2001; Ekman, 1992; Frijda et al.,
1989; Izard, 1991; Scherer, 1997a; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994) suggesting that the
emotional states studied to date are shared universally (although there are clear
differences in theoretical perspectives concerning the source of the universality, ranging
from the bioevolutionary perspective of basic emotions to constructivist points of view).
If discrete emotions are universal, and emotion response system coherence exists, then
such coherence should be found across individuals in different cultural contexts. We test
that notion below by examining coherence within a large sample of respondents across a
wide range of countries and cultures.
Third, emotion response system coherence may be moderated by culture, and
uncovering if this is so is important theoretically because such findings can inform
questions concerning the source of unique phenomenologies associated with discrete
emotions. Previous findings indicating unique self-reported physiological sensations
associated with discrete emotional states (Frijda et al., 1989; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994)
can be interpreted as suggestive of either a correspondence with an underlying, discrete
biophysiological basis for emotion, or socially-shared constructions about emotional
experience. In fact Rime et al. (1990) demonstrated that unique physiological profiles
reported when emotion is actually aroused could be generated by students asked to
describe the stereotypic changes that occur when emotion is aroused, suggesting that self-
reports of actual emotional experience could be socially constructed. Breugelmans et al.
(2005), however, demonstrated that the same pattern of responding was obtained in two
samples with very low exposure to western cultures, arguing against a total
constructivistic viewpoint.
An examination of the coherence among emotion response systems across
cultures informs this debate because a total social-constructivist viewpoint implies that
coherence would differ in different sociocultural contexts. It is one thing to argue that
mean levels of individual response are constructed; but coherence among responses
implies a much stronger effect of social construction. If coherence is found across
cultures, therefore, that would be evidence against the constructivist viewpoint. But if
culture does moderate coherence, that would provide some evidence for the influence of
social construction in self-reported phenomenologies of emotional responding.
Description of the Data Set and Analytic Strategy
The study reported here addresses these issues through a reanalysis of data
previously published in Scherer and Wallbott’s (Scherer, 1997a, 1997b; Scherer &
Wallbott, 1994; Wallbott & Scherer, 1995) International Study of Emotion Antecedents
and Reactions (ISEAR). In this project 2,921 participants in 37 countries across 5
continents completed a questionnaire about the antecedents of and their reactions to seven
emotions (more detail below in Methods). A previous study using this data set (Scherer &
Wallbott, 1994) demonstrated country differences on experience, verbal reactions,
nonverbal reactions, and attempts to control expressive behavior. No report, however, has
examined relationships among the various responses, nor the degree to which cultural
variables moderated such relationships, which is what we do. Our report, therefore,
addresses important new questions on an existing data set that heretofore have not been
addressed.
Additionally, a reanalysis of this data set is timely because of the development of
new statistical techniques that can better handle the ISEAR data structure. The data set
constitutes a multilevel (or nested) data structure in that persons were nested within
countries. Over the past 10 to 15 years, a consensus has emerged that a technique known
as Multilevel Random Coefficient Modeling (MRCM) provides the most accurate
parameter estimates for such hierarchically-nested data (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992;
Nezlek, 2001, in preparation). The accuracy of the parameter estimates is based largely in
the fact that MRCM uses maximum likelihood procedures to estimate parameters, rather
than traditional ordinary least squares approaches underlying ANOVA or regression.
Within a multilevel framework, the present analyses are known as two level
models, one level representing individuals (Level 1), the other representing countries
(Level 2). These analyses estimate means for each measure, and the degree to which the
means vary both within- and between-countries. Importantly for this report, the analyses
can also provide estimates of relationships (covariances) between variables within each
country (i.e., at Level 1). Variables at Level 2 can be further used to estimate the degree to
which mean levels of the variables at Level 1, or relationships between variables at Level 1,
are related to variables at Level 2.
In this study the country-level, Level 2 variables came from Hofstede’s  (2001)
long-term study of cultural dimensions. In his most recent publication, Hofstede (2001)
reported data from 72 countries, and defined his dimensions in the following manner:
Individualism v. Collectivism : The degree to which cultures encourage people to
look after themselves and their immediate family only, or encourage people to belong to
ingroups that are supposed to look after them in exchange for loyalty.
Power Distance: The degree to which cultures encourage less powerful members
within groups to accept the fact that power is distributed unequally.
Uncertainty Avoidance: The extent to which people feel threatened by unknown
or ambiguous situations, and the extent to which they have developed beliefs, institutions,
or rituals to avoid them.
Masculinity v. Femininity: The distribution of emotional roles between men and
women, characterized on one end of a continuum by success, money, and things, and on
the other end by caring for others and quality of life.
Long v. Short Term Orientation: The degree to which cultures encourage delayed
gratification of material, social, and emotional needs among its members.
Although other sources of country-level cultural data do exist, such as Schwartz’s
(Schwartz, 2004) value orientations or Bond et al’s (Bond et al., 2004) social axioms, we
use Hofstede’s dimensions in this initial report because they are arguably the best-known
and well-studied dimensions, they capture well the cultural diversity among countries of
the world, they represent different aspects of culture, and they provide an excellent
broad-stroked base that can be used to understand cultural variability.
Goals and Hypotheses
Using the ISEAR data set and MRCM techniques, we addressed four goals: (1) to
re-assess between- and within-culture variability in means regarding phenomenological
emotional responding; (2) to examine the relationships between country-level differences
in these means and the Hofstede cultural dimensions; (3) to examine within-culture
relationships among the variables, to assess emotion response system coherence; and (4)
to examine if the relationships obtained in (3) were moderated by culture.
Scherer and Wallbott (1994) had previously found only small to moderate country
by emotion interactions on subjective experience, physiological sensations, and verbal
and nonverbal behaviors, the same variables we examine here (çs ranging from .16 to
.24). For this reason we, too, expect that most of the mean variance to be attributed to
within-country effects.
Still, there should be some between-country differences in means, and these
should be related to culture. Previous studies have interpreted between-country
differences in various emotion-related phenomena to occur because of cultural
differences in Individualism v. Collectivism (Kitayama & Markus, 1994; Matsumoto &
Ekman, 1989; Mesquita, 2001). On one hand, members of collectivistic cultures express
(Ekman, 1972; Matsumoto & Kupperbusch, 2001), and believe they express (Pittam et
al., 1995), basic emotions (i.e., anger, contempt, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and
surprise) less than members of individualistic cultures. Members of collectivistic cultures
also rate these same emotions expressions as less intense (Biehl et al., 1997; Matsumoto
& Ekman, 1989), and experience them less intensely (Matsumoto et al., 1988; Scherer et
al., 1988). On the other hand, members of collectivistic cultures have also been shown to
experience self-conscious emotions such as shame and guilt more strongly than members
of individualistic cultures (Kitayama et al., 1995). Thus we hypothesize that
individualism is positively correlated with basic emotions, indicating greater emotional
reactivity, while at the same time negatively correlated with shame and guilt.
As mentioned above, only one study (Frijda et al., 1989) has examined the
coherence between self-reported emotional reactions, finding a positive correlation
between appraisals and action tendencies. Other studies (reviewed above), however, have
found such coherence among emotional experience, expressive behavior, and physiology.
Thus we predict that such coherence will be found in the ISEAR data set as well, in the
form of significant, within-country relationships among the emotion variables.
Finally, cultural differences in mean levels of emotional responding lead us to
believe that culture also influences the relationships (coherence) among variables. This
notion is supported by Matsumoto and Kupperbusch’s (2001) finding that the relationship
between subjective experience and emotional expression was positive for idiocentric
individuals (i.e., those with individualistic tendencies), but negative for allocentric
individuals (those with collectivistic tendencies) when experiencing strong emotions in
the presence of an experimenter. Thus, we predict that the level of coherence among
emotional responses is stronger in individualistic than collectivistic cultures.
Method
Emotion Data
The emotion data came from the ISEAR study described above (Scherer &
Wallbott, 1994; Scherer et al., 1986; Wallbott & Scherer, 1986). Participants completed a
two page questionnaire about seven emotions: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness,
shame, and guilt. The questionnaire consisted of four parts. In the first, participants
described the situation that elicited the emotion. In the second, they described their
subjective feelings by rating the duration, intensity, and impact of the event on
relationships with other people. In the third, participants described their physiological
symptoms, expressive reactions, and the degree to which they tried to control their
reactions. In the fourth, participants answered questions related to their appraisals of the
situation.
The data from the second and third parts of the questionnaire were analyzed in
this study. Participants rated the intensity of their emotional experience using a 4-point
scale (1 = Not Very, 2 = Moderately, 3 = Intense, and 4 = Very Intense). They also rated
the degree to which they tried to control or hide their feelings using a 4-point scale (1 =
Not at All, 2 = A Little, 3 = Very Much, and 0 = Not Applicable).
Expressive reactions were measured with a checklist of 11 nonverbal reactions
and 8 verbal utterances; respondents checked all they experienced. We focused on verbal
and nonverbal reactions. Verbal behavior was computed by summing each time
participants selected silence, short utterance, one or two sentences, or lengthy utterance.
These scores ranged from 0-3. Nonverbal behavior was computed by tallying each time
respondents selected laughing/smiling, crying/sobbing, other facial expression change,
screaming/yelling, other voice changes, and changes in gesturing. These scores ranged
from 0-6. These scores were the same as those used in the Scherer and Wallbott (1994)
report.
Physiological symptoms were measured with a checklist of 11 bodily symptoms;
respondents checked all they experienced. The symptoms were grouped into three
categories: Ergotropic Arousal, which included change in breathing, heart beating faster,
muscles tensing/trembling, perspiring/moist hands (scores ranging from 0-4);
Trophotropic Arousal, including lump in throat, stomach troubles, crying/sobbing (scores
ranging 0-3); and Felt temperature, including feeling cold/shivering, feeling
warm/pleasant, feeling hot/cheeks burning (0 being assigned when no temperature
symptom was mentioned) (scores ranging from -1 to +2). These categories were based on
Gellhorn’s (1970) classification, were used in Scherer and Wallbott’s (1994) report, and
are the variables in the database provided by Scherer.
Culture Data
The culture data came from Hofstede’s (2001) database. There are data on the
original four dimensions from 50 countries and 3 regions; data on Long Term Orientation
(LTO) exist for 29 countries and 2 regions. Additionally, index score estimates for
another 16 countries were available in Hofstede’s (2001), and these were used for
Bulgaria, China and Poland. Scores were standardized prior to analysis. For this report,
we had data on 36 countries for the four original Hofstede dimensions, and 25 countries
on LTO.
Analytic Strategy
The analyses were done using Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) (Raudenbush
et al., 2000). HLM provides the option to weight observations at either level 1 or 2 (within
or between countries in the present case). Given the differences in populations for the
countries included in these analyses, level 2 weights were used to reflect these differences.
Weighting simply by raw population was not appropriate, however, because the differences
in populations were too large. Raw population (in millions) was distributed with M = 102.4,
SD = 270.6. For example, China and India had populations over 1.0 billion, whereas New
Zealand had a population of approximately 4 million and Finland had approximately 5
million. A normal distribution of weights was obtained by dividing the raw population by
1.0 million and then taking the log of this (M = 1.32, SD = .69); all analyses were
conducted using these transformed weights.1
Results
Variance Decomposition for All Variables
The first analyses were “totally unconditional” (null) models; that is, there were no
predictors at either Levels 1 or 2. These analyses estimated means and within- and
between-country variances. The equations representing these analyses are below:
Level 1: yij = b0j + rij.
Level 2: b0j = g00 + u0j.
In the Level 1 model, b0j is a random coefficient representing the mean of y for
country (j) across the i persons in each country, and rij represents the deviation of each
person from the mean of his or her country. The variance of rij constitutes the
within-country variance. In the Level-2 (country level) model, g00 represents the grand
mean of the country means (b0js) from the Level 1 model, u0j represents the deviation of
each country’s mean from the grand mean for all countries, and the variance of u0j
constitutes the Level-2 (or between country) variance.2
A summary of the initial, unconditional analyses is presented in Table 1. The most
salient aspect of these data is that the vast majority (over 90% in all cases, over 95% in
most cases) of the variance for all measures for all emotions was within countries,
suggesting that there were only few, small differences between countries compared to
differences within countries.
Relationships between Country-Level Means and Hofstede Scores
We examined relationships between countries’ scores on the Hofstede dimensions
and coefficients describing the mean for each country (the intercepts from the Level 1
model). Two sets of analyses were done. The first included the four dimensions for which
we had data for 36 countries: Power Distance (PD), Uncertainty Avoidance (UA),
Individualism v. Collectivism (IN), and Masculinity v. Femininity (MF). Including these
measures simultaneously adjusted the coefficients for the covariation among the scales
(which was pronounced for PD and IN, r = -.67). We had data for only 25 countries for
Long v. Short Term Orientation (LT); thus this dimension was analyzed separately.
The first analyses estimated means (intercepts in the multilevel framework) for
each country using an unconditional model at Level 1. Hofstede scores were included at
Level 2, uncentered because they had been standardized prior to analysis. The Level 2
model was:
Level 2: b0j = g00 + g01(UA) + g02(PD) + g03(IN) + g04(MA) + u0j.
Relationships between Hofstede scores and intercepts for the emotion variables
were evaluated by the significance of these coefficients. The results are summarized in
Table 2. Overall, there were negative relationships between Long Term Orientation (LT)
and nonverbal expressions (6 of 7 emotions), verbal expressions (four emotions
significant or marginally significant), trophotropic symptoms (three emotions significant
or marginally significant), ergotropic symptoms (6 of 7 emotions), and felt temperature of
fear. There were positive relationships between LT and felt temperature for four emotions
(joy, sadness, shame, and guilt). In addition, there were positive relationships between
Uncertainty Avoidance and trophotropic symptoms (5 of 7 emotions).
HLM estimates unstandardized coefficients, meaning that coefficients represent
the change associated with a 1 unit change in a predictor. Hofstede scores were
standardized prior to analysis; thus coefficients represent changes in dependent measures
associated with a 1 sd change in Hofstede scores. For example, for nonverbal expression
of fear, LT had a coefficient of -.12. For every 1 unit increase in country scores on LT,
mean nonverbal expression of fear decreased .12.
It was possible that the findings involving LT occurred because it was analyzed
separately from the other culture dimensions. This was not the case, however. LT was not
correlated with any of the other four culture dimensions, either as bivariate correlations or
in a simultaneous multiple regression. Thus, correlations between LT and other culture
dimensions could not have accounted for the relationships between LT and the dependent
measures.
The results for Emotional Intensity and Subjective Control were less clear. There
were few significant relationships, and these formed no clear pattern.
Coherence among Emotion Response Systems
Coherence was operationally defined in terms of linear relationships among the
different types of response variables. These relationships were examined with the
following Level 1, within-country model:
Level 1: yij = b0j + b1j (Intensity) + rij.
Level 2: b0j = g00 + u0j.
Level 2: b1j = g10 + u1j.
For example, in examining the relationship between the intensity of emotional
experience and expression, a slope representing the relationship between expression and
intensity was estimated (b1j) for each country. Intensity was entered group-mean centered;
thus country-level differences in intensity did not contribute to parameter estimates. The
mean relationship (across all countries) between expression and intensity was evaluated by
the significance of the g10 coefficient. If g10 was significantly different from 0, then the
mean relationship between expression and intensity was different from 0. Such
coefficients are referred to as slopes in multilevel analyses.
The results of these analyses are summarized in Table 3. There were positive
relationships between intensity of emotional experience and nonverbal emotional
expression for all seven emotions. In contrast, there were significant relationships
between intensity and verbal expression for only anger and disgust. These coefficients
were unstandardized; each represented how much a dependent measure changed for each
1 unit increase in the predictor. For example, the coefficient (slope) for intensity in the
analysis of expression of nonverbal sadness was .29. On average, across all countries, for
every 1 unit increase in emotional intensity, nonverbal expression of sadness increased
.29.
Relationships between emotion intensity and physiological sensations were
examined with a similar model, with individual physiological symptoms as independent
measures at Level 1. Emotion intensity was positively related to trophotropic and
ergotropic symptoms for all seven emotions, and with felt temperature for four emotions
(Table 3).
Relationships between expression and physiological symptoms were examined
with the same model. Verbal expression was positively related to ergotropic symptoms
for six of seven emotions, and with felt temperature for six of seven emotions. Nonverbal
expression was positively related to both trophotropic and ergotropic symptoms for all
seven emotions, and to felt temperature for four emotions (Table 3).
Relationships between verbal and nonverbal expressions were structurally similar
to the above analyses, except that verbal expression was the dependent measure and
nonverbal expression was the predictor. Nonverbal expression was entered group-mean
centered. Verbal and nonverbal expression were positively related for all seven emotions
(Table 3).
Relationships between subjective control and expression were examined using
models that were structurally similar to those used to examine relationships between the
other variables above. Control was entered group-mean centered. There were significant,
negative relationships between verbal expression and control for all seven emotions. The
slopes for anger, disgust, and joy in particular were high. The pattern of results was
similar but weaker for nonverbal expression, with only four of seven emotions producing
significant results, and those that were significant were substantially smaller than the
slopes for verbal expression (Table 3).
Does Culture Moderate Response System Coherence?
To examine if culture moderated the within-country relationships reported in
Table 3, a series of analyses were done in which the within-country coefficients (the b1j
coefficients from the initial analyses) were modeled at Level 2 as a function of Hofstede
scores. The results of these analyses followed no clear pattern. Although Hofstede scores
were related to mean levels of many of the measures, there were few significant
relationships between Hofstede scores and the slopes described in the previous analyses.
Moreover, the few significant relationships that did occur followed no clear pattern (table
of results available from the first author).
Discussion
There are several findings of note in this study. First, the vast majority of variance
in the data set was due to individual differences within countries; a much smaller
proportion of that total variance, under 5% in most cases, was due to between-country
differences. Second, cultures were associated with mean differences. Third, there were
consistent and reliable relationships among the variables, indicating coherence among the
emotion response systems. Fourth, these relationships were not moderated by culture.
This study was not conducted without limitation, one of which concerned the status
of the culture data. Limitations of Hofstede’s culture dimensions, especially Individualism
v. Collectivism, have been discussed recently (Bond et al., 2004; Oyserman et al., 2002;
Schwartz, 2004). Moreover, they represent values, originally assessed in the workplace,
and values are only one part of subjective culture. Still, we contend that the Hofstede
dimensions provide the best broad-stroked view of culture, and are the most well-studied.
Moreover, they are highly correlated with other sets of available country-level data.
Individualism, for instance, is highly correlated with Schwartz’s Affective Autonomy and
Egalitarianism (Schwartz, 2004), and with country-level differences in Extraversion and
Openness (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004). Thus it is very likely that even if other cultural
dimensions were used, the same pattern of results would have been obtained on similar
cultural dimensions.
The lack of cultural differences in relationships among the emotion variables
represents accepting the null hypothesis and raises questions about statistical power.
Unfortunately, power analyses for multilevel analyses are complex and not thoroughly
understood at present. For our analyses, the ability to detect cultural differences in within-
country relationships can probably be understood best in terms of two factors: the number
of countries and the reliability of the within-country relationships (slopes in multilevel
modeling). For the original Hofstede dimensions, there were 36 countries; if one uses OLS
power analyses as a guideline, provided a power of .41 to detect a .3 correlation. The other
factor, the reliability of the slopes, was impossible to estimate for many slopes because the
random effect was not significant, and in MRCM, determining the reliability of a
coefficient requires estimating a random effect. It is entirely possible (and statistically
appropriate) to model level 2 differences in level 1 coefficients for which no random effect
was estimated. Such coefficients are described as non-randomly varying – i.e., fixed effects
that are varying without an associated random effect. Therefore, in the present analyses, we
were able to model cultural (level 2) differences in within-country (level 1) relationships,
irrespective of whether or not a random effect was estimated for a coefficient representing a
relationship. For this reason we cannot be certain if the present data set provided high
power to detect cultural differences in within-country relationships.
With these caveats in mind, the results of the variance decomposition analyses are
sobering to anyone interested in the relationship between culture and emotion. Many
studies, especially those conducted within a social-constructionist framework, imply that
culture exerts a strong influence on emotions. Kitayama and Markus (1994), for instance,
speculate about the “mutual constitution” of culture, emotion, and personality, suggesting
that emotions can only be understood in their unique cultural milieu. Even outside this
framework, when cultural differences are found, it is easy to assume that those differences
are large, accounting for substantial portions of variance among individuals. The data from
this study, however, suggest that the variance accounted for by country or culture is not
very large, and that the bulk of variability found is more aptly ascribed to individual rather
than cultural differences.
The country differences that did occur were related to culture. In particular, cultures
with long-term orientations, compared to short-term, had less verbal and nonverbal
expressions and physiological sensations. A typical interpretation of these findings would
suggest that long-term cultures may have greater needs to curb emotional reactions to
maintain a longer-term focus on daily events. In this view, high emotional reactivity is
potentially more disruptive to such plans, and cultures with more short-term focus have
greater freedom to express and experience transient emotions.
But, long-term cultures also had lower means on several emotion intensity and
subjective control variables, indicating that their members had somewhat less intense
emotional experiences to begin with, and exerted less subjective control over their
reactions. This suggests, therefore, that it is not that members of long-term cultures actively
suppress their reactions, but that members of short-term cultures experience emotions more
intensely, exert relatively more subjective control over them, and produce more verbal and
nonverbal expression and heightened physiological sensations. This alternative
interpretation, in fact, is supported by data from multiple extant sources. First, countries
high on Hofstede’s Long-Term Orientation tend to be negatively associated with country-
level differences on Extraversion (McCrae, 2002), suggesting that members of short-term
cultures may experience emotions more intensely. Second, emotional experiences figure
more prominently in the lives of people from short-term oriented cultures (Suh et al.,
1998). Third studies of cultural differences in emotion judgments have indicated that
members of short-term cultures exaggerate their ratings of the intensity of emotional
expressions relative to judgments of actually felt emotions, but members of long-term
cultures do not (Matsumoto et al., 1999). In short, members of long-term cultures may not
suppress their emotional responses; instead, members of short-term cultures may be more
emotional.
That Long v. Short Term Orientation was related to many more aspects of
emotional responding compared to Individualism v. Collectivism is an interesting
finding. As mentioned above, many previous studies (Kitayama & Markus, 1994;
Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989; Mesquita, 2001) have used the Individualism v.
Collectivism framework to interpret cultural differences. The current findings suggest
that a more important cultural dimension is Long v. Short Term Orientation. These
findings are also congruent with a recent, 30-country study of cultural display rules of
emotional expression (Matsumoto et al., 2005), which highlighted the importance of this
dimension in predicting country differences in display rules. This dimension may have
been overlooked in the past due to the field’s preoccupation with Individualism v.
Collectivism, and the fact that different cultural dimensions were not tested against each
other in the previous studies, as we did here.
There were a number of emotion- and response-specific findings to note. Contrary
to prediction, collectivistic cultures were not associated with greater intensity of shame or
guilt experiences, nor with any other aspect of emotional responding. Additionally, long-
term cultures were associated with lower subjective control on shame and guilt, and
lower nonverbal (but not verbal) expressions on these emotions. Clearly these findings
need to be reconciled in the future. Also, long-term orientation was negatively correlated
with verbal and nonverbal expression, and with ergotropic and trophotropic symptoms,
but positively correlated with felt temperature. Uncertainty Avoidance was associated
with increased trophotropic symptoms for five emotions, but relatively unrelated to other
aspects of emotional responding. Differential patterns of associations suggest differential
emotion profile responding, and future studies may examine this possibility in more
detail in the future (more below).
The present findings provided support for the notion of universality in coherence
among phenomenologically-based emotion response systems. In the emotion literature, the
notion of coherence generally refers to a specific pattern of relationships among emotion
components (appraisals, experience, expression, behaviors, and physiology) that is the
same for the same discrete emotions across individuals but different for different emotions.
For example, in Mauss et al. (2005), the experience of amusement was positively correlated
with skin conductance, but the experience of sadness was negatively correlated. The
specific pattern of relationships for each emotion is probably related to how each emotion
prepares the organism to deal with environmental demands; anger prepares us to fight,
while fear prepares us to flee. These different behavioral responses require different yet
coordinated preparatory responses, which is integrated by emotion.
In this study, however, coherence could not be measured with such precision,
because participants responded to checklists and data were summed within and across
categories. For example the Nonverbal Behavior variable was the composite sum of
laughing/smiling, crying/sobbing, other facial expression change, screaming/yelling,
other voice changes, and changes in gesturing. Thus the relationships we observed
referred to associations between amounts of general response system categories, e.g., the
amount of emotional experience and the amount of nonverbal behavior, but not the specific
type of nonverbal behavior. For this reason the correlations among the response systems
were always in the same direction (with the exception of the relationships with subjective
control), thus hiding potentially different relationships with specific aspects of each
response system. This was unavoidable due to the nature of the data set available, and to
the fact that single responses within computed variables would be too unreliable. Future
studies, therefore, will need to explore the possibility that unique relationships among
phenomenological response systems exist for specific types of responses within each
system.
The coherence findings also highlight the difference between self-reports of verbal
and nonverbal expression. Although these two types of expressive behaviors were related
to each other, they functioned differently. Emotional experience and physiological
sensations were more strongly related to nonverbal than verbal behavior, and suggests that
these responses are more closely linked together than with verbal behavior. This is
probably related to the fact that experience, physiology, and nonverbal behaviors are linked
to emotions phylogenetically, whereas verbal behavior is a rather recent evolutionary
product. Verbal expressions were more strongly related to subjective control than
nonverbal expression, suggesting that control efforts affect verbal behavior more directly
than nonverbal behavior. This finding is also consistent with the view that verbal behaviors
are more controllable than nonverbal when emotions are aroused (Ekman & Friesen, 1974;
Tomkins, 1978), and with the fact that lower face behaviors are more controllable than
upper face (Matsumoto & Lee, 1993).
The relationships among the emotion variables were not moderated by culture.
These findings are noteworthy because they implicate the source of the coherence obtained
in this study, and the emotion-specific findings obtained previously using this same data set
by Scherer and Wallbott (Scherer, 1997b; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994) and by others (Frijda
et al., 1989; Roseman et al., 1994). As mentioned in the Introduction, previous findings
have been interpreted to have occurred because of discrete neurophysiological processes
underlying emotions, and that the phenomenological experience of emotion corresponded
with these underlying processes. Rime et al. (1990), however, demonstrated that emotion-
specific phenomenological responses could be produced by asking participants about how
people typically experience emotion, thus suggesting that such responses are based in
shared social knowledge or beliefs about emotion. Breugelmans et al. (2005) countered that
discrete phenomenological responding occurred in two very rural cultures, and suggested
that such responding was probably not due exclusively to shared social beliefs about
emotion, because it occurred in such vastly different cultures. Our findings support this
latest position, because it is probably more difficult for social construction to affect
relationships among variables than just mean levels. Coherence among the
phenomenological response variables, therefore, is more likely due to an underlying actual
coherence among emotion responses and not because of social construction.
Yet, our data do not entirely rule out the influence of construction. The
relationships we observed, while consistent among the various response systems, were still
relatively weak to moderate. This leaves much room for other processes to influence the
response systems, including individual differences and social constructivist ones. A more
appropriate interpretation of our data, therefore, suggests that the coherence we observed
probably occurred because of an underlying neurophysiological basis of coherence among
discrete emotions that still leaves room for considerable environmental influence.
This point is related to the finding that cultures appear to be related to differences in
mean levels of the various responses, but not to the relationships (coherence) among them.
Collectively, these findings put the universality-cultural relativism debate about emotions
in a different light. More specifically, cultures may be associated with mean absolute levels
of responding, especially in expressive behavior, because these tend to have social-
communicative features and are thus more influenced by cultural norms. The variance
decomposition findings, the relative lack of cultural influences on emotional experience,
subjective control, and the relationships among the response systems suggest, however, that
culture has much less influence on the structure and organization of emotions. This is
probably related to the notion that cultures may exert relatively less influence on
psychological processes that are more strongly influenced by underlying genetic factors,
and relatively more on those processes that are socially constructed (Poortinga, 1990).
Emotions involve both genetically-based, neurophysiological components as well as
socially constructed ones (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). Our data, which were self-reports of
actual emotional experiences, may be more reflective of the former, thus resulting in less
between-country/culture variability. It is entirely possible that other aspects of self-reported
emotion, such as beliefs, attributions, opinions, which constitute culturally-based
worldviews about emotions, are associated with larger cultural differences (Matsumoto, in
press). This might account for larger cultural differences obtained in studies from a
constructivist viewpoint. Future studies examining the relationship between culture and
emotion, therefore, may examine the relative degrees of cultural influences depending on
the specific aspect of emotion examined.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for All Variables
Verbal Expression Nonverbal Expression
Emotion Intercept Between Within % Within Intercept Between Within % Within
Joy 2.00 .08 .93 92 1.49 .03 .88 97
Fear .73 .03 .79 96 .97 .05 .95 95
Anger 1.64 .09 1.20 93 1.37 .05 1.16 96
Sad .76 .04 .95 96 1.29 .08 1.03 93
Disgust 1.07 .05 1.09 96 .93 .04 .79 95
Shame .86 .02 .87 98 .94 .05 .86 95
Guilt .91 .04 1.03 96 .81 .04 .88 96
Emotional Intensity Subjective Control
Emotion Intercept Between Within % Within Intercept Between Within % Within
Joy 3.14 .01 .71 99 1.28 .01 .27 96
Fear 3.07 .04 .78 95 1.87 .03 .57 95
Anger 2.99 .02 .74 97 1.58 .01 .51 98
Sad 3.18 .02 .72 97 1.85 .03 .53 95
Disgust 2.68 .04 .88 96 1.67 .01 .55 98
Shame 2.59 .04 .88 96 2.25 .03 .52 95
Guilt 2.59 .03 .84 97 2.05 .02 .57 97
Trophotropic Symptoms Ergotropic Symptoms
Emotion Intercept Between Within % Within Intercept Between Within % Within
Joy .16 .01 .16 .94 .79 .05 1.00 .95
Fear .49 .02 .43 .96 1.97 .12 1.65 .93
Anger .33 .02 .31 .94 1.49 .10 1.49 .94
Sad .71 .03 .43 .93 .89 .09 1.30 .94
Disgust .43 .03 .34 .92 .77 .06 1.10 .95
Shame .34 .01 .33 .97 1.02 .05 1.36 .96
Guilt .41 .02 .37 .95 .79 .05 1.21 .96
Felt Temperature
Emotion Intercept Between Within % Within
Joy .86 .02 .50 .96
Fear -.05 .03 .88 .97
Anger .60 .02 1.05 .98
Sad -.03 .01 .56 .98
Disgust .12 .03 .60 .95
Shame .74 .12 1.10 .90
Guilt .27 .05 .75 .94
Note: Columns labeled “Between” contain estimates of the between-country variance,
columns labeled “Within” contain estimates of the within-country variance, and columns
labeled “% Within” contain the percent of total variance that was within-countries.
Table 2
Relationships between Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions with All Variables
Verbal Expression Nonverbal Expression
Emotion PD UA IN MA LT PD UA IN MA LT
Joy -.14*
Fear -.08* -.15** -.12**
Anger -.09a -.11**
Sad -.10** -.13**
Disgust -.08a -.08a -.07**
Shame .08a -.07**
Guilt -.13**
Emotional Intensity Subjective Control
Emotion PD UA IN MA LT PD UA IN MA LT
Joy -.04* -.04a .02a
Fear -.10** -.07a
Anger
Sad .07a .11*
Disgust -.06*
Shame -.09* -.06* -.13**
Guilt -.09*
Trophotropic Symptoms Ergotropic Symptoms
Emotion PD UA IN MA LT PD UA IN MA LT
Joy .05** .05** -.09*
Fear .08** .05a -.09** .11** -.17**
Anger .05* -.04a -.18a
Sad .09** -.17**
Disgust -.15** -.13**
Shame -.06** .10* -.12**
Guilt .09** -.07** -.16**
Felt Temperature
Emotion PD UA IN MA LT
Joy .05a .05*
Fear .13** -.09**
Anger -.08**
Sad -.05* .05**
Disgust
Shame .10* .17**
Guilt .15*
Note: For all tables containing coefficients, coefficients with p >.10 were not tabled. PD
= Power Distance; UA = Uncertainty Avoidance; IN = Individualism v. Collectivism;
MA = Masculinity v. Femininity; LT = Long v. Short Term Orientation
* p < .05, ** p < .01, a .05 < p < .10
Table 3
Mean Within-Country Relationships Demonstrating Coherence Between Emotional
Response Systems
Emotion Intensity and
Expression
Emotion Intensity and Physiology
Emotion Verbal Nonverbal
Verbal and
Nonverbal
Expression Trophotropic
Symptoms
Ergotropic
Symptoms
Felt
Temperature
Joy .20** .13** .26** .13** .11**
Fear .23** .24** .16** .14** -.04*
Anger .10** .21** .25** .20** .18** .05**
Sad .29** .15** .22** .17**
Disgust .06** .15** .23** .25** .24**
Shame .13** .21** .30** .18** -.04**
Guilt .22** .26** .29** .18**
Verbal Expression and Physiology Nonverbal Expression and Physiology
Emotion TrophotropicSymptoms
Ergotropic
Symptoms
Felt
Temperature
Trophotropic
Symptoms
Ergotropic
Symptoms
Felt
Temperature
Joy -.13* .07** .22** .28** .22**
Fear .04** .04** .26** .22**
Anger -.07a .14** .10** .33** .33** .10**
Sad .08** .09** .31** .30**
Disgust .10** .10** .21** .32** .07*
Shame .04* .03a .23** .26** .11**
Guilt .08** .10** .25** .31** .06a
Subjective Control and
Expression
Emotion Verbal Nonverbal
Joy -.37** -.17**
Fear -.14** .06a
Anger -.49** -.15**
Sad -.11**
Disgust -.39** -.11**
Shame -.20**
Guilt -.21** -.07**
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, a .05 < p < .10
Footnotes
                                                
1 Although weighted analyses were more appropriate, the results of unweighted
analyses were similar to the results presented in this article.
2 Initially, all coefficients (intercepts and slopes) were modeled as random. When
necessary, coefficients were modeled as fixed (i.e., no random error term was estimated)
according to guidelines that are standard for multilevel modeling. A description of these
guidelines is available in Nezlek (in preparation), and a detailed description of the error
terms that were and were not estimated in the present analyses can be obtained from the
second author. It should be noted that all intercepts in all analyses were modeled as
random effects.
